The good, the bad and the ugly: Australian defence and strategic policy in an uncertain future
December
This is the final piece of a four-part UTS:ACRI Analysis series that examines an interlinked set of questions for Australian defence and strategic policy stemming from the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) released in April 2023. The series began by providing an assessment of the consistency between the stated concept of deterrence at the heart of the DSR and the capability acquisitions (including the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines) that are flagged to implement that strategy.
Australian defence strategy, deterrence and the PRC’s military posture
December
This is the third of a four-part UTS:ACRI Analysis series that examines an interlinked set of questions for Australian defence and strategic policy stemming from the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) released in April 2023. The series began by providing an assessment of the consistency between the stated concept of deterrence at the heart of the DSR and the capability acquisitions (including the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines) that are flagged to implement that strategy.
Australia’s post-DSR posture and US ‘integrated deterrence’: A road to nowhere?
December
This is the second of a four-part UTS:ACRI Analysis series that examines an interlinked set of questions for Australian defence and strategic policy stemming from the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) released in April 2023. The series began by providing an assessment of the consistency between the stated concept of deterrence at the heart of the DSR and the capability acquisitions (including the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines) that are flagged to implement that strategy.
AUKUS, the Defence Strategic Review and Australia’s quest for deterrence
December
This is the first of a four-part UTS:ACRI Analysis series that examines an inter-linked set of questions for Australian defence and strategic policy stemming from the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) released in April 2023. The series begins by providing an assessment of the consistency between the stated concept of deterrence at the heart of the DSR, and the capability acquisitions (including the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines) that are flagged to implement that strategy. It asks whether both the strategy and capabilities are in fact fit for their stated purpose.
What is the biggest challenge facing AUKUS?
December
Note: This article appeared in Britain's World, the Council on Geostrategy’s online magazine, as part of the expert panel, 'What is the biggest challenge facing AUKUS?', on September 15 2023.
For Labor, AUKUS could trigger a warning shot from Chinese-Australian voters
December
The US navy is still more powerful than China’s: More so than the Australian government is letting on
December
Australia’s deterrence dichotomy
December
Cyber impacts on the US/PRC military balance | WEBINAR
December
Scholarly debate on the prospects for war and peace between the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) often refer to the visible military build-up. The Australian government has published the view, from its Defence Strategic Review, that ‘China's military build-up is now the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end of the Second World War’.
No Biden. So how relevant is the Quad?
December
Note: This article appeared in 360info on May 17 2023. It was republished in The Canberra Times on May 21 2023.